

DRAFT: JBG

7 September 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR DDCI

SUBJECT: CIA Participation in the Psychological Strategy Board

1. The problem of CIA participation in the activities of the Psychological Strategy Board, including the deliberations of the staff under this board, have been carefully considered on a continuing basis since the first inception of this Board.

2. The Psychological Strategy Board represents potentially one of the most effective elements of the Government to assist CIA in the prosecution of the activities for which it is held responsible in NSC 10/2. This is because it provides a far better media than has heretofore existed for both the resolution of inter-agency problems involving CIA and for insuring adequate coordination of CIA activity with activities of the other Governmental agencies.

3. This factor was early recognized by CIA planners who have made every effort to influence the development of PSB towards a useful article with respect to CIA's interests. It was quickly perceived that for PSB to be effective in resolving inter-agency difficulties and coordinating the parallel efforts of the various Government agencies involved in the field of psychological strategy, two factors must be present in the deliberations of this Board:

a. Its field of endeavor must be broad enough to encompass the entire group of Governmental activities having psychological impact, (i.e., The "broad" interpretation of the Board's functions).

b. It must be permitted to come to grips with the operational and planning problems of the agencies whose activities it is coordinating to a far greater extent than has previously been accomplished at this level in the government. This is also necessary because of its mission to

4. While the introduction of these two elements is particularly important to CIA, in view of the extreme value of PSB to CIA interests, they (particularly the latter) at the same time present a problem of security and propriety which requires special consideration of the nature of CIA's participation in PSB's activities.

5. It is believed that the following courses of action to be undertaken in coordination with the PSB Staff will reduce this security and propriety problem, to one of only a very slight and very acceptable risk commensurate with other risks taken by this agency.

a. All personnel dealing with PSB problems, including the "ad hoc panels" now operating under the Director, should be selected and controlled by the following special measures:

(1) They should all be acceptable from a security standpoint to CIA (and other agencies if requested by them).

(2) The number of such personnel should be kept to an absolute minimum. The same personnel should be reemployed on successive panels or other PSB efforts to the maximum extent practicable.

(3) The principle of interlocking directorates should be employed to the maximum extent practicable. That is, the same personnel serving on PSB panels, etc., should have secondary hats on appropriate committees at other levels of the Government which are concerned with the same problems.

b. Information concerning CIA activity which is reflected in any way at the PSB level should be held to that which is absolutely necessary to permit effectiveness. Early experience with PSB indicates that this need to know may be described as follows:

(1) The most

ILLEGIB

(1) The most specific information required at the PSB level is probably with respect to what are concrete tasks appropriate for assignment to CIA as part of an integrated inter-agency effort. The broad brush treatment of these tasks in present popular usage at this level of the Government is, in general, insufficient to permit the understanding of a proper relationship of overt to covert tasks. This will, of course, result in reflecting the nature of CIA activities in the PSB. Although in many instances sanitized wording may alleviate the disclosure made in resulting documents it will, in general, be necessary for the committees involved to understand the factual interpretation of these words.

(2) The next most specific information necessarily disclosed at this level will be an over-all assessment of CIA capabilities with respect to proposed tasks. While couched in general terms, these assessments must be available at the PSB level to insure that planning undertaken there is realistic.

(3) There is little or no necessity as yet reflected for detailed disclosure of CIA assets. This may be introduced at a later date when PSB seeks to perform its mission of evaluation. When this becomes a necessity, special arrangements should be effected with one or two key personnel of the PSB staff to have access to such of these details as are necessary to permit proper evaluation.

6. Another requirement which has arisen with connection with CIA participation on the PSB is the need to insure coordination on PSB matters within CIA. Experience has indicated that agendas for PSB meetings are required well in advance so that sufficient time will be possible for the proper briefing of

preparation of documents under consideration at these meetings. Further, there is a requirement for these latter personnel to be early acquainted with action taken in the PSB meetings with which they will become involved and of the personal views of the Director or his deputies on these matters.

7. If you agree with this analysis, it is recommended that you discuss this paper with ^{25X1A} [REDACTED] in order that these suggestions may be placed into effect.